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Two-Layered Falsification of Hybrid Systems
Guided by Monte Carlo Tree Search
Zhenya Zhang, Gidon Ernst, Sean Sedwards, Paolo Arcaini, and Ichiro Hasuo
Abstract—Few real-world hybrid systems are amenable to
formal verification, due to their complexity and black box
components. Optimization-based falsification—a methodology of
search-based testing that employs stochastic optimization—is
thus attracting attention as an alternative quality assurance
method. Inspired by the recent work that advocates coverage
and exploration in falsification, we introduce a two-layered opti-
mization framework that uses Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS),
a popular machine learning technique with solid mathematical
and empirical foundations (e.g. in computer Go). MCTS is used
in the upper layer of our framework; it guides the lower layer
of local hill-climbing optimization, thus balancing exploration
and exploitation in a disciplined manner. We demonstrate the
proposed framework through experiments with benchmarks from
the automotive domain.
Index Terms—cyber-physical system, hybrid system, testing,
falsification, stochastic optimization, temporal logic
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Hybrid Systems
QUALITY assurance of cyber-physical systems (CPS) isa problem of great interest. Errors in CPS, such as
cars and aircrafts, can lead to economic and social damage,
including loss of human lives. Unique challenges in quality
assurance are posed by the nature of CPS: in the form of hybrid
systems they comprise the discrete dynamics of computers and
the continuous dynamics of physical components. Continuous
dynamics combined with other features, such as complexity
(a modern car can contain 108 lines of code) and black-box
components (such as parts coming from external suppliers),
make it very hard to apply formal verification to CPS.
An increasing number of researchers and practitioners are
therefore turning to optimization-based falsification as a quality
assurance measure for CPS. The problem is formalized as
follows.
The falsification problem
• Given: a modelM (that takes an input signal u and
yields an output signal M(u)), and a specification
ϕ (a temporal formula)
• Find: an error input, that is, an input signal u such
that the corresponding output M(u) violates ϕ
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Fig. 1. From Boolean to robust semantics
u // M
M(u)
6|= ϕ ?
//
In the optimization-based falsification approach, the above fal-
sification problem is turned into an optimization problem. This
is possible thanks to robust semantics of temporal formulas [1].
Instead of the Boolean satisfaction relation v |= ϕ, robust
semantics assigns a quantity Jv, ϕK ∈ R∪{∞,−∞} that tells
us, not only whether ϕ is true or not (by the sign), but also how
robustly the formula is true or false. This allows one to employ
hill-climbing optimization (see Fig. 1): we iteratively generate
input signals, in the direction of decreasing robustness, hoping
that eventually we hit negative robustness.
Optimization-based falsification is a subclass of search-
based testing: it adaptively chooses test cases (input signals
u) based on previous observations. One can use stochastic
algorithms for optimization, such as simulated annealing (SA),
globalized Nelder-Mead (GNM [2]) and covariance matrix
adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-ES [3]), which turn out to
be much more scalable than model checking algorithms that
rely on exhaustive search. Note also that the system model
M can be black box: observing the correspondence between
input u and output M(u) is enough. Observing an error
M(u′) for some input u′ is sufficient evidence for a system
designer to know that the system needs improvement. Besides
these practical advantages, optimization-based falsification is
an interesting topic from a scientific point of view, combining
formal and structural reasoning with stochastic optimization.
The approach of optimization-based falsification was initi-
ated in [1] and has been actively pursued ever since [4], [5],
[6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. See [15] for a
recent survey. There are now mature tools, such as Breach [8]
and S-Taliro [4], which work with industry-standard Simulink
models.
B. The Exploration-Exploitation Trade-off in Falsification
In optimization-based falsification, the important role of
coverage is advocated by many authors [7], [6], [5], [10] (see
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Fig. 2. Our two-layered optimization framework
also §V). One reason is that in highly nonconvex optimization
problems for falsification, eager hill climbing can easily be
trapped in local minima and thus fail to find an error input (i.e.
a global minimum) that exists elsewhere. Another reason is that
coverage gives a certain degree of confidence for absence of
error input, in case search for error input is unsuccessful.
This puts us in the exploration-exploitation trade-off, a typ-
ical dilemma in stochastic optimization and machine learning
(specifically in reinforcement/active learning). While exploita-
tion guides us to pursue the direction that seems promising,
based on the previous observations, we have to occasionally
explore in order to avoid getting stuck in local minima. Many
common stochastic hill-climbing algorithms, such as SA, GNM
and CMA-ES, contain implicit exploration mechanisms. At the
same time, explicit methods for exploration in falsification have
been pursued e.g. in [7], [6], [5], [10] (see §V).
Contribution: Our main contribution is, in the context
of hybrid system falsification, to balance exploration and
exploitation in a systematic and mathematically disciplined
way using Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS). We integrate
hill-climbing optimization in MCTS, and obtain a two-layered
optimization framework.
MCTS is an expected outcome [16] algorithm that searches
a tree whose nodes are usually organized according to causal
relationships, interleaving search (walking down the already
expanded tree in a promising direction) with playout (ex-
panding a new node and estimating its reward). One reason
for the success of MCTS is that its search strategies nicely
balance exploration and exploitation. The most common search
strategy, UCT (UCB applied to trees [17]), is derived from the
solid theoretical background of the UCB (upper confidence
bounds) strategy for multi-armed bandit problems [18]. Typical
applications allowing such a structured search space are deci-
sion problems, such as games. In particular, MCTS is attracting
a lot of attention thanks to its success in computer Go [19].
While MCTS is a relatively new methodology, it has already
established its position in the rapidly growing community of
machine learning. See [20] for a survey.
Our framework uses robustness values as rewards in MCTS,
and employs hill-climbing optimization for playout in MCTS.
This way we integrate hill-climbing in Monte Carlo tree search
in a systematic way. In our two-layered framework (Fig. 2),
the upper optimization layer picks (by MCTS) a region in
the input space, from which a concrete input value should
be sampled. The lower layer then picks (by hill-climbing)
an optimal concrete input value within the prescribed region.
time
throttle
u1
u2
u3
u4
time
vehicle speed
v
Fig. 3. A piecewise constant input signal (one-dimensional, throttle, left) for
a simple automotive powertrain model, and the corresponding output signal
(one-dimensional, vehicle speed, right).
We also compute the robustness of the specification under the
chosen input. This value is fed back to the upper layer as
a reward, which is then used by the tree search strategy to
balance exploration and exploitation.
In our two-layered framework, hill-climbing optimization—
whose potential in falsification of hybrid systems has been
established, see e.g. [15]—is supervised by MCTS, with MCTS
dictating which region to sample from. By expanding new
children, MCTS can tell the hill-climbing optimization to try
an input region that has not yet been explored, or to exploit and
dig deep in a direction that seems promising. This combination
of MCTS and application-specific lower-layer optimization
seems to be a useful approach that can apply to problems other
than hybrid system falsification. See §V for further discussion.
Our use of MCTS depends on our time-staged approach to
falsification [21], in which we synthesize K input segments one
after another. Those input segments are for the time intervals
[0, TK ), [
T
K ,
2T
K ), . . . , [
(K−1)T
K , T ], where T is the time horizon.
The search tree will then be of depth K. See Fig. 3. In this
paper we restrict input signals to piecewise-constant ones (this
is a common assumption in falsification); an edge in the MCTS
search tree from depth i − 1 to i (see Fig. 2) determines the
input value ui for the interval [
(i−1)T
K ,
iT
K ).
We have implemented our two-layered falsification frame-
work in MATLAB, building on Breach [8].1 Our experiments
with benchmarks from [22], [23], [24] demonstrate the possible
performance improvements, especially in the ability of finding
rare counterexamples.
Organization: In §II we formulate the falsification prob-
lem. In §III we present our main contribution, namely a two-
layered optimization framework for falsification that combines
MCTS and hill-climbing. Our experimental results are in §IV.
In §V we discuss related work, locating the current work in the
context of falsification and also of other applications of MCTS
and related machine learning methods. In §VI we conclude
with some directions of future research.
Notations: The set of (positive, nonnegative) real numbers
is denoted by R (and R+,R≥0, respectively). Closed and open
intervals are denoted such as [0, 2] and (2, 3); [0, 2) = {x ∈
R | 0 ≤ x < 2} is a half-closed half-open interval. For a set
X , |X| denotes its cardinality.
II. PROBLEM: HYBRID SYSTEM FALSIFICATION
We formulate the problem of hybrid system falsification. We
also introduce robust semantics of temporal logics [1], [9] that
1Code obtained at https://github.com/decyphir/breach.
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allows us to reduce falsification to an optimization problem.
Definition 2.1 (time-bounded signal): Let T ∈ R+ be a
positive real. An m-dimensional signal with a time horizon
T is a function w : [0, T ]→ Rm.
Let w : [0, T ] → Rm and w′ : [0, T ′] → Rm be m-
dimensional signals. Their concatenation w ·w′ : [0, T+T ′]→
Rm is an m-dimensional signal defined by (w ·w′)(t) := w(t)
if t ∈ [0, T ], and w′(t− T ) if t ∈ (T, T + T ′].
Let T1, T2 ∈ (0, T ] such that T1 < T2. The restriction
w|[T1,T2] : [0, T2 − T1] → Rm of w : [0, T ] → Rm to the
interval [T1, T2] is defined by (w|[T1,T2])(t) := w(T1 + t).
Definition 2.2 (system modelM): A system model, with m-
dimensional input and n-dimensional output, is a function M
that takes an input signal u : [0, T ]→ Rm and returns a signal
M(u) : [0, T ]→ Rn. Here the common time horizon T ∈ R+
is arbitrary.
Some recent works, including [25], use sequences of time-
stamped values as basic objects in their problem formulation,
in place of continuous-time signals (as we do in the above).
This difference is mostly presentational and not essential.
As a specification language we use signal temporal logic
(STL) [26]. We do so for simplicity of presentation; we can
also use more expressive logics such as the one in [27].
In what follows Var is the set of variables. Variables stand
for physical quantities, control modes, etc. ≡ denotes syntactic
equality.
Definition 2.3 (syntax): In STL, atomic propositions
and formulas are defined as follows, respectively: α ::≡(
f(x1, . . . , xn) > 0
)
, and ϕ ::≡ α | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ∧ϕ | ϕUI ϕ.
Here f is an n-ary function f : Rn → R, x1, . . . , xn ∈ Var,
and I is a closed non-singular interval in R≥0, i.e. I = [a, b]
or [a,∞) where a, b ∈ R and a < b.
We omit subscripts I for temporal operators if I = [0,∞).
Other common connectives and operators, like ∨,→,>, I
(always) and ♦I (eventually), are introduced as abbreviations:
♦Iϕ ≡ > UI ϕ and Iϕ ≡ ¬♦I¬ϕ. Atomic formulas like
f(~x) ≤ c, where c ∈ R is a constant, are also accommodated
by using negation and the function f ′(~x) := f(~x)− c.
Definition 2.4 (robust semantics [9]): For an n-dimensional
signal w : R≥0 → Rn and t ∈ R≥0, wt denotes the t-shift of
w, that is, wt(t′) := w(t+ t′).
Let w : R≥0 → R|Var| be a signal, and ϕ be an STL
formula. We define the robustness Jw, ϕK ∈ R ∪ {∞,−∞}
as follows, by induction. Here
d
and
⊔
denote infimums and
supremums of real numbers, respectively. Their binary version
u and unionsq denote minimum and maximum.Jw, f(x1, · · · , xn) > 0K := f(w(0)(x1), · · · ,w(0)(xn))Jw,⊥K := −∞ Jw,¬ϕK := −Jw, ϕKJw, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2K := Jw, ϕ1K u Jw, ϕ2KJw, ϕ1 UI ϕ2K := ⊔t∈I( Jwt, ϕ2K udt′∈[0,t)Jwt′ , ϕ1K )
Here are some intuitions and consequences of the definition.
The robustness Jw, f(~x) > cK stands for the vertical margin
f(~x) − c for the signal w at time 0. A negative robustness
value indicates how far the formula is from being true.
The robustness for the eventually modality is computed byJw,♦[a,b](x > 0)K = ⊔t∈[a,b]w(t)(x).
Fig. 4. Our MCTS search tree for a system modelM with two input signals,
throttle and brake, whose ranges are [0, 100] and [0, 325], respectively. We
partition each range into two intervals, i.e. L1 = L2 = 2, hence the branching
degree |A| is 2× 2.
The original semantics of STL is Boolean, given by a binary
relation |= between signals and formulas. The robust semantics
refines the Boolean one as follows: Jw, ϕK > 0 implies
w |= ϕ, and Jw, ϕK < 0 implies w 6|= ϕ, see [1, Prop. 16].
Optimization-based falsification via robust semantics hinges on
this refinement. Although the definitions so far are for time-
unbounded signals only, we note that the robust semanticsJw, ϕK, as well as the Boolean satisfaction w |= ϕ, can be
easily adapted to time-bounded signals (Def. 2.1).
Finally, here is a formalization of the falsification problem. It
refines the description in §I. In particular, its use of real-valued
robust semantics enables hill-climbing optimization. See Fig. 1.
Definition 2.5 (falsifying input): Let M be a system model,
and ϕ be an STL formula. A signal u : [0, T ] → Rm is a
falsifying input if JM(u), ϕK < 0 (implying M(u) 6|= ϕ).
III. TWO-LAYERED OPTIMIZATION FRAMEWORK WITH
MONTE CARLO TREE SEARCH
In this section we present our main contribution, namely a
two-layered optimization framework for hybrid system falsi-
fication. It combines: Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) [20]
for high-level planning in the upper layer; and hill-climbing
optimization (such as SA, GNM [2] and CMA-ES [3]) for
local input search in the lower layer. See Fig. 2 for a schematic
overview. The upper layer steers the lower layer using the UCT
strategy [17], an established method in machine learning for
balancing exploration and exploitation.
We present two algorithms: the basic two-layered algorithm
(Alg. 1), and a version enhanced with progressive widening
(Alg. 3). The auxiliary functions used therein are presented
in Alg. 2. Our algorithms work on an MCTS search tree, as
illustrated in Fig. 4.
A. The Basic Two-Layered Algorithm (Alg. 1)
We start with Alg. 1, using the example in Fig. 4.
a) Time Staging: We search for a falsifying input signal,
focusing on piecewise-constant signals (Fig. 3, left). The
interval [0, T ] is divided into K equal sub-intervals (K is
a tunable parameter). The time points 0, TK ,
2T
K , . . . ,
(K−1)T
K
at which those intervals start are called control points. Our
goal is therefore to find a sequence u1, . . . ,uK , where each
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Algorithm 1 Basic Two-Layered Algorithm
Require: a system model M, an STL formula ϕ, intervals Ii = [umini , umaxi ], i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, for the ranges of input
u1, . . . , uM of M, time horizon T ∈ R+, and the following tunable parameters: the number K of control points, the
number Li of partitions of the input range [umini , u
max
i ] for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, the scalar c in Line 2 of Alg. 2, and an
MCTS budget (the maximum number of MCTS samples, Line 9)
1: function MCTSPREPROCESS
2: A← {1, . . . , L1} × · · · × {1, . . . , LM} . the set of actions
3: T ← {ε} . the MCTS search tree, initially root-only
4: N ← (ε 7→ 0) . visit count N initialized, defined only for ε
5: R← (ε 7→ ∞) . reward function R initialized
6: −→u ← null . place holder for a falsifying input
7: Rmin ←∞ . place holder for a minimum reward
8: −→a min ← null . the most promising action sequence
9: while R(ε) ≥ 0 and within the MCTS budget do
10: MCTSSAMPLE(ε)
11: if −→u 6= null then . a falsifying input is found already in preprocessing
12: return −→u
13: else . return the most promising action sequence
14: return −→a min
15: function MCTSSAMPLE(w) . let w = a1 . . . ad with ai ∈ A
16: N(w)← N(w) + 1
17: if |w| < K then
18: if wa′ ∈ T for all a′ ∈ A then . if all children have been expanded
19: a← UCBSAMPLE(w) . pick a child wa by UCB
20: MCTSSAMPLE(wa) . recursive call
21: R(w)← mina′∈AR(wa′) . back-propagation
22: else
23: randomly sample a ∈ A from {a | wa 6∈ T } . expand a random unexpanded child wa
24: T ← T ∪ {wa}
25: u1, . . . ,uK ← arg minHillClimb
u1∈REG(a1),...,ud∈REG(ad),
ud+1∈REG(a),
ud+2,...,uK∈I1×···×IM
JM(u1 . . .uK), ϕK . playout by hill-climbing
26: N(wa)← 0
27: R(wa)← JM(u1 . . .uK), ϕK
28: if R(wa) < 0 then
29: −→u ← u1 . . .uK . a falsifying input is found and stored in −→u
30: if R(wa) < Rmin then
31: Rmin ← R(wa)
32: −→a min ← a1 . . . ada
33: R(w)← mina′∈AR(wa′) . back-propagation
34: function MAIN
35: −→x ← MCTSPREPROCESS
36: if −→x = −→u , an input signal then . Line 11
37: return −→u
38: else . −→x = a1a2 . . . aK′ ∈ A∗ with some K ′ ≤ K, Line 13
39: return arg minHillClimb
u1∈REG(a1),...,uK′∈REG(aK′ ),
uK′+1,...,uK∈I1×···×IM
JM(u1 . . .uK), ϕK
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Algorithm 2 Auxiliary Functions for Algs. 1 & 3
1: function UCBSAMPLE(w)
2: return arg max
a∈A
((
1− R(wa)
maxw′∈T R(w′)
)
+ c
√
2 lnN(w)
N(wa)
)
3: function REG(a) . The input region for an action a ∈ A is of the form (k1, . . . , kM ), see Line 2 of Alg. 1
4: return
∏M
i=1
[
umini +
ki−1
Li
(umaxi − umini ) , umini + kiLi (umaxi − umini )
]
Algorithm 3 Two-Layered Algorithm with Progressive Widening
Require: The same data as required in Alg. 1, and additionally, constants C,α (used in Line 4)
The algorithm is the same as Alg. 1, except that the function MCTSSAMPLE is replaced by the following one.
1: function MCTSSAMPLE(w) . let w = a1 . . . ad with ai ∈ A
2: N(w)← N(w) + 1
3: if |w| < K then
4: if
( ∣∣{a′ ∈ A | wa′ ∈ T }∣∣ ≥ C ·N(w)α
or wa′ ∈ T for all a′ ∈ A
)
then . progressive widening: all or enough children expanded
5: a← UCBSAMPLE(w) . pick a child wa by UCB
6: MCTSSAMPLE(wa) . recursive call
7: R(w)← mina′∈AR(wa′) . back-propagation
8: else
9: S ← (a maximal convex subset of ⋃wa′ 6∈T REG(a′))
10: u1, . . . ,uK ← arg minHillClimb
u1∈REG(a1),...,ud∈REG(ad),
ud+1∈S,
ud+2,...,uK∈I1×···×IM
JM(u1 . . .uK), ϕK . playout by hill-climbing
11: a← (a ∈ A such that ud+1 ∈ REG(a))
12: T ← T ∪ {wa}
13: N(wa)← 0
14: R(wa)← JM(u1 . . .uK), ϕK
15: if R(wa) < 0 then
16: −→u ← u1 . . .uK
17: if R(wa) < Rmin then
18: Rmin ← R(wa)
19: −→a min ← a1 . . . ada
20: R(w)← mina′∈AR(wa′) . back-propagation
ui = (ui1, . . . , uiM ) is an M -dimensional real vector (M is
the number of input signal dimensions for the model M), so
that the corresponding piecewise-constant signal is a falsifying
one (Def. 2.5).
We assume intervals Ii = [umini , u
max
i ], i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, for
the ranges of input u1, . . . , uM of the model M.
b) The Search Tree: A search tree in MCTS has a
branching degree |A|, where the set A is called an action set
in the MCTS literature. In Go, for example, an action set A
consists of possible moves.
We use, as the action set A, a partitioning of the input space
I1×· · ·×IM . We partition the input space into L1×· · ·×LM
hypercubes of equal size, according to predetermined param-
eters L1, . . . , LM , where M is the number of input signals of
the system and Li indicates how finely the i-th input should
be partitioned. In Fig. 4 we present an example where M = 2
and L1 = L2 = 2. There we have four actions in the set A,
corresponding to the four square regions.
An edge in our search tree represents a choice of an input
region—from which we choose the input value ui—for a single
control point (i−1)TK . The depth of the tree is K (the number
of control points). We follow the usual convention and specify
a node of a |A|-branching tree by a word w = a1a2 . . . aj over
the alphabet A, where j ≤ K. That is: the root is ε (the empty
word), its child in the direction a1 ∈ A is a1, its children are
a1a1, a1a2, . . . , and so on.
In general, a node in an MCTS search tree is decorated
by two values: reward R and visit count N . In our case,
R stores the current estimate of the smallest (i.e. the best)
robustness value. Both values are updated explicitly during
back-propagation (see below).
c) Monte Carlo Tree Search Sampling: Much like usual
MCTS, Alg. 1 iteratively expands the search tree T . Initially
the tree T is root-only (Line 3), and in each iteration—called
MCTS sampling—the invocation of MCTSSAMPLE on Line 10
adds one new node to T . In the MCTS literature, expanding a
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Fig. 5. Playout by hill-climbing optimization
child means adding the child to T . We repeat MCTS sampling
until a counterexample is found, or the MCTS budget is used
up after the maximum number of iterations (Line 9).
The exploration-exploitation trade-off in MCTS comes in
the choice of the node to add. In each MCTS sampling, we
start from the root (Line 10), walk down the tree T , choosing
already expanded nodes (Lines 19–20), until we expand a child
(Lines 23–24). Growing a wider tree means exploration, while
a deeper tree means exploitation.
We use the UCT strategy [17], the most commonly used
strategy in MCTS, to resolve the dilemma. UCT is based on
the UCB strategy for the multi-armed bandit problems [18];
Line 2 of Alg. 2 follows UCB, where the exploitation score
1 − R(wa)maxw′∈T R(w′) and the exploration score
√
2 lnN(w)
N(wa) are
superposed using a scalar c. Recall that our rewards R(wa) for
w’s children are given by robustness estimates from previous
simulations, and that falsification favors smaller R. Note also
that values of R can be greater than 1. In the exploitation
score 1 − R(wa)maxw′∈T R(w′) , therefore, we normalize rewards to
the interval [0, 1] and reverse their order.2 The exploration score√
2 lnN(w)
N(wa) is taken from UCB: the visit count N(w) gives how
many times the node w has been visited, that is, how many
offspring the node w currently has in T . The scalar, for the
trade-off, is a tunable parameter, as usual in MCTS.
d) Playout and Back-Propagation: In MCTS, the reward
of a newly expanded node a1a2 . . . ada (see e.g. Line 24)
is computed by an operation called playout. The result is
then back-propagated, in a suitable manner, to the ancestors:
a1 . . . ad, a1 . . . ad−1, . . . , and finally ε.
In our MCTS algorithms for falsification we use hill-
climbing optimization (e.g. SA, GNM and CMA-ES) for
playout. See Line 25, where input values u1,u2, . . . ,uK are
sampled by stochastic hill-climbing optimization, so that the
resulting robustness value of the specification ϕ becomes
smaller. The regions from which to sample those values are
dictated by the MCTS tree: u1 ∈ REG(a1), . . . ,ud ∈ REG(ad)
2We can assume nonnegative values of R , otherwise we already have a
falsifying input.
follow the actions a1, . . . , ad determined so far (here REG is
from Alg. 2); ud+1 ∈ REG(a) follows the newly chosen action
a (Line 23); and the remaining values ud+2, . . . ,uK can be
chosen from the whole input range I1 × · · · × IM .
Fig. 5 illustrates an example of playout by hill-climbing
optimization. Smaller gray squares represent actions, and red
dots represent input values (notice that they are chosen from
the gray regions). The values u1, . . . ,uK are sampled repeat-
edly so that the robustness value JM(u1 . . .uK), ϕK becomes
smaller.
An intuition of this playout operation is that we sample the
best input signal, u1 . . .uK , under the constraints imposed by
the MCTS search tree (namely, the input regions prescribed
by the actions). The least robustness value thus obtained
is assigned to the newly expanded node wa as its reward
(Line 27). If R(wa) < 0 then this means we have already
succeeded in falsification (Line 29).
Back-propagation is an important operation in MCTS. Fol-
lowing the intuition that the reward R(w) is the smallest
robustness achievable at the node w, we define the reward
of an internal node w by the minimum of its children’s
rewards. See Lines 21 and 33. Note that, via recursive calls of
MCTSSAMPLE (Line 20), the result of playout is propagated
to all ancestors.
e) A Two-Layered Framework: In Alg. 1, hill-climbing
optimization occurs twice, in Lines 25 and 39. The first
occurrence is in playout of MCTS—this way we interleave
MCTS optimization (by growing a tree) and hill-climbing
optimization. See Fig. 2. MCTS optimization is considered to
be a preprocessing phase in Alg. 1 (Line 35): its principal role
is to find an action sequence −→a min, i.e. a sequence of input
regions, that is most promising. In the remainder of the MAIN
function, the second hill-climbing optimization is conducted
for falsification, where we sample according to −→a min.
The two occurrences of hill-climbing optimization therefore
have different roles. Given also the fact that the first occurrence
is repeated every time we expand a new child, we choose
to spend less time for the former than the latter. In our
implementation, we set the timeout to be 5–15 seconds for the
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Fig. 6. Lines 9–11 of Alg. 3
first hill-climbing sampling in Line 25 (TOpo in §IV), while
for the second hill-climbing sampling in Line 39 the timeout
is 300 seconds.
A falsifying input −→u is often found already in the prepro-
cessing phase. In this case the MAIN function simply returns−→u (Line 37).
B. The Two-Layered Algorithm with Progressive Widening
(Alg. 3)
Our second algorithm (Alg. 3) differs from the basic one
(Alg. 1) in two ways:
a) Progressive Widening: Alg. 3 uses progressive widen-
ing [28]; see Line 4. Unlike in the basic algorithm (Line 18 of
Alg. 1), we do not always expand a new child, even if there
are unexpanded ones; the threshold C · N(w)α is computed
using the visit count N(w) and tunable parameters C,α.
Progressive widening is a widely employed technique in
MCTS for coping with a large or infinite action set A—in such
a case expanding all children incurs a lot of computational
cost. See e.g. [29]. In our Alg. 3 the action set A can be
large, depending on the numbers L1, . . . , Lm of input range
partitions.
b) Hill-Climbing Optimization for Expanding Children:
In progressive widening, since we may not expand all the
children, it makes sense to be selective about which child
to expand. This is in contrast to random sampling in Alg. 1
(Line 23). See Line 10 of Alg. 3, where we first playout
by hill-climbing optimization. The value ud+1 thus obtained
is then used to determine which child wa to expand, in
Line 11. In order to ensure that the new child wa is indeed
previously unexpanded, the value ud+1 is sampled from the
set
⋃
wa′ 6∈T REG(a
′); in fact, we restrict to its convex subset
(Line 9), because many hill-climbing optimization algorithms
work best in a convex domain. See Fig. 6 for illustration.
C. Discussion
Our algorithms interleave MCTS optimization and hill-
climbing optimization: the latter is used in the playout opera-
tion of the former, for sampling and estimating the reward of
a high-level input-synthesis strategy. This high-level strategy
is concretely given by a sequence a1a2 . . . ad of input regions.
Via the UCT tree search strategy, we ensure that our search in a
search tree is driven not only by depth, but also by width. This
way we enhance exploration in search-based falsification, in
the sense that different regions of the input space are sampled
in a structured and disciplined manner. It is an interesting topic
for future work to quantify the coverage guarantees that can
potentially be achieved by our approach.
In falsification of hybrid systems, it is often the case that
simulation, i.e. running a model M under a given input
signal, is computationally the most expensive operation. In our
algorithm this occurs in Lines 25 and 39, since a hill-climbing
optimization algorithm tries many samples of u1, . . . ,uK .
Simplifying Line 25, e.g. by decimating the control points,
can result in a useful variation of our algorithm.
Among the tunable parameters of the algorithm is the scalar
c, used for the UCB sampling (Line 2 of Alg. 2). Having
this parameter is unique to our falsification framework, in
comparison to simple robustness-guided optimization (with
hill-climbing only). Specifically, the parameter c endows our
algorithm with flexibility in the exploration-exploitation trade-
off. Given the diversity of instances of the hybrid system
falsification problem, it is unlikely that there is a single value
of c that is optimal for all falsification examples. An engineer
can then use her/his expert domain knowledge to tune the
parameter c.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We have implemented our basic algorithm (Alg. 1, denoted
“Basic”) and our progressive widening algorithm (Alg. 3,
denoted “P.W.”) in MATLAB, using Breach [8] as a front-
end for hill-climbing optimization and for its implementation
of the robust semantics.
The experiments have two goals. Firstly, in §IV-B, we
evaluate the falsification performance of our proposal in com-
parison to the state-of-the-art. Since our MCTS enhancement
emphasizes coverage, our interest is in the success rate in hard
problem instances rather than in execution time. Secondly,
in §IV-C, we evaluate the impact of different choices of
parameters for our algorithms (such as the UCB scalar c in
Alg. 2).
A. Experiment Setup
The experiments are based on the following benchmarks.
The automatic transmission (AT) model is a Simulink model
that was proposed as a benchmark for falsification in [22]. It
has input signals throttle ∈ [0, 100] and brake ∈ [0, 325], and
computes the car’s speed speed , the engine rotation rpm , and
the selected gear gear . We consider the following specifica-
tions, taken in part from [22].
S1 ≡ [0,30] (speed < 120) can be falsified easily by
hill-climbing with an input throttle = 100 and brake = 0
throughout.
S2 ≡ [0,30] (gear = 3 → speed ≥ 20) states that in gear
three, the speed should not get too low. The difficulty arises
from the lack of guidance by robustness as long as gear 6= 3:
we follow [22] and take gear = 1, . . . , gear = 4 as Boolean
propositions, instead of taking gear as a numeric variable. In
contrast to [22], we use a more difficult speed threshold of 20
instead of 30.
S3 ≡ ♦[10,30] (speed 6∈ [53, 57]) states that it is not possible
to maintain a constant speed after 10s. A falsifying trace needs
precise inputs to hit and maintain the narrow speed range.
S4 ≡ [0,29](speed < 100)∨[29,30](speed > 65) is a spec-
ification designed to demonstrate the limitation of robustness-
guided falsification by hill-climbing optimization only. Here,
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a falsifying trajectory has to reach high speed before braking.
Similarly to S2, the speed 100 has to be reached much earlier
than the indicated time bound of 29 to give sufficient time for
deceleration. However, by using the maximum as semantics
for the ∨-connective, the robustness computation can shadow
either of the disjuncts .
S5 ≡ [0,30](rpm < 4770 ∨ [0,1](rpm > 600)) aims to
prevent systematic sudden drops from high to low rpm . It is
falsified if an rpm peak above 4770 is immediately followed
by a drop to rpm ≤ 600.
The second benchmark is the Abstract Fuel Control (AFC)
model [23]. It takes two input signals, pedal angle and engine
speed, and outputs the critical signal air-fuel ratio (AF ),
which influences fuel efficiency and car performance. The
value is expected to be close to a reference value AFref . The
pedal angle varies in the range [0, 61.1] and the engine speed
varies in the range [900, 1100]. According to [23], this setting
corresponds to normal mode, where AFref = 14.7.
The basic requirement of the AFC is to keep the air-to-
fuel ratio AF close to the reference AFref . However, changes
to the pedal angle cause brief spikes in the output signal AF
before the controller is able to regulate the engine. Falsification
is used to discover the amplitude and periods of such spikes.
The formal specification Sbasic is [11,30](¬(|AF −
AFref | > 0.05 ∗ 14.7)). It is violated when AF deviates
from its AFref too much. Another specification is Sstable:
¬(♦[6,26][0,4](|AF − AFref | > 0.01 ∗ 14.7)). The goal is
to find spikes where the ratio is off by a fraction 0.01 of the
reference value for at least t′ seconds during the interval [6, 26].
The third benchmark model is called Free Floating Robot
(FFR) that has been considered as a falsification benchmark
in [24]. It is a robot vehicle powered by four boosters and
moving in two spatial dimensions. It is governed by the
following second-order differential equations:
x¨ = 0.1 · (u1 + u3) cos(ϕ)− 0.1 · (u2 + u4) sin(ϕ)
y¨ = 0.1 · (u1 + u3) sin(ϕ) + 0.1 · (u2 + u4) cos(ϕ)
ϕ¨ = 5/12 · (u1 + u3)− 5/12 · (u2 + u4)
The goal of the robot is to steer from (x, y, ϕ) = (0, 0, 0) to
x = y = 4, with a tolerance of 0.1, such that x˙ and y˙ are within
[−1, 1], given a time horizon of T = 5. The four inputs ui ∈
[−10, 10] range over the same domain. We run falsification on
the negated requirement: Strap ≡ ¬ ♦[0,5] x, y ∈ [3.9, 4.1] ∧
x˙, y˙ ∈ [−1, 1].
The experiments use Breach version 1.2.9 and MAT-
LAB R2017b on an Amazon EC2 c4.large instance (March
2018, 2.9 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2666, 2 virtual CPU cores, 4 GB
main memory).
B. Performance Evaluation
The results are shown in Table I and are grouped with respect
to the method: uniform random sampling (“Random”) as a
baseline, Breach, our “Basic” algorithm (Alg. 1) and our “P.W.”
algorithm (Alg. 3), as well as with respect to the underlying
hill-climbing optimization solver (CMA-ES, GNM and SA).
Run times are shown in seconds. Since the algorithms are
stochastic, we give the success rate out of a number of trials.
For all the experiments, input signals are chosen to be
piecewise constant, with K = 5 control points for AT and
AFC, and K = 3 control points for FFR (due to the shorter
time horizon). These numbers coincide with the depth of
the MCTS search trees. In Breach, this is achieved with the
“UniStep” input generator, with its .cp attribute set to K.
The timeout for Breach was set to 900 seconds (which is well
above all successful falsification trials) with no upper limit on
the number of simulations. For our P.W. algorithm, we used
the parameters C = 0.7 and α = 0.85 (Line 4 of Alg. 3).
The choice of parameters for our two MCTS-based al-
gorithms is as follows: for each combination with the hill-
climbing optimization solvers, we present a set of parameters
that give good results over all the specifications. This is
justified, because the performance is quite dependent on these
parameters, and one choice that works for a given combination
of a falsification algorithm and a hill-climbing solver might just
not work for another combination. However, note that we do
not change the settings across the specifications.
As we discuss at the end of §III-A, different timeouts are
set for hill-climbing in playout (Line 25 of Alg. 1) and to
hill-climbing at the end (Line 39 of Alg. 1). Specifically, the
timeout for the former is TOpo in Table I (5–15 seconds) while
the timeout for the latter is globally 300 seconds.
The results in Table I indicate, at a high-level, that for
seemingly hard problems, the benefit of the extra exploration
done by the MCTS layer significantly increases the falsification
rate. This is most evident in S4 and S5, where Breach (with
any of CMA-ES, GNM or SA) has at most 30–40% success
rates. Our MCTS enhancements succeed much more often.
For easy problems, the increased exploration typically in-
creases the falsification times, which is expected. One reason
is that falsification is in general a hard problem that can
only be tackled by heuristics. We note from Table I that
the additional execution time is often not prohibitively large.
We also note that there is generally no single algorithm that
works on all instances equally well. For example, for Sstable,
both Breach and our algorithms are even weaker than random
testing. However, our algorithms still increase the falsification
rate compared to Breach.
The choice of a hill-climbing optimization solver has a
great influence on the outcome. CMA-ES has built-in support
for some exploration before the search converges in the most
promising direction. Nevertheless, we see that the upper-layer
optimization by MCTS can improve success rates (S4, S5,
Sstable). The Nelder-Mead variant GNM has very little support
for exploration and furthermore, Breach’s implementation is
not stochastic (it uses deterministic low-discrepancy sequences
as a source of quasi-randomness). For this reason, the method
quickly converges to non-falsifying minima that are local and
cannot be escaped without extra measures. Thus, using MCTS
pays off especially with GNM; see for example S3 and S4.
Conversely, SA heavily relies on exploration and keeps just
a single good trace found so far, limiting its exploitation. In
combination with MCTS, SA shows mixed performance. In
some cases falsification time becomes longer (S1, S3), whereas
for S4, MCTS is able to overcome this particular limitation,
presumably because it maintains several good prefixes. For
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF UNIFORM RANDOM SAMPLING AND BREACH AGAINST ALGS. 1 (BASIC) AND 3 (P.W.). For each specification, we show the success rate
out of 10 trials, and the average run time (in seconds) of those trials which were successful. The respective parameters are shown in the leftmost columns:
M b (MCTS budget) is the maximum visit count for the root of the MCTS search tree (i.e. the maximum number of nodes of the tree); TOpo (in seconds)
is the timeout (wall-clock) for each individual MCTS playout by hill-climbing optimization; c is the scalar for the exploration-exploitation trade-off in UCB
(Alg. 2). The number K of control points is 5 for AT and AFC, and 3 for FFR. The partitioning L of the input space w.r.t. each dimension is 3× 5 for AT
(throttle, brake) and AFC (pedal, engine), and 2× 2× 2× 2 for FFR (u1, u2, u3, u4). For progressive widening (Alg. 3) we use the parameters C = 0.7
and α = 0.85. Timeout for the hill-climbing in the end (Line 39 of Alg. 1) is 300 seconds. For random testing, timeout is 900s. The cells with bold fonts
are local best performers w.r.t. each hill-climbing solver, and green backgrounded cells are the global performers w.r.t. each property. Here, the ranking
criterion takes success rate as first priority, and average time as second priority.
Parameters AT model AFC model FFR model
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Sbasic Sstable Strap
Algorithm M b TOpo c succ. time succ. time succ. time succ. time succ. time succ. time succ. time succ. time
Random 10/10 108.9 10/10 289.1 1/10 301.1 0/10 - 0/10 - 6/10 278.7 10/10 242.6 4/10 409.3
C
M
A
-E
S Breach 10/10 21.9 6/10 30.3 10/10 193.9 4/10 208.8 3/10 75.5 10/10 111.7 3/10 256.3 10/10 119.8
Basic 40 15 0.20 10/10 15.8 10/10 108.5 10/10 697.1 7/10 786.8 9/10 384.4 10/10 182.0 7/10 336.9 10/10 338.0
P.W. 40 15 0.20 10/10 10.8 10/10 65.7 10/10 728.6 7/10 767.8 10/10 648.1 10/10 177.1 8/10 272.9 10/10 473.9
G
N
M Breach 10/10 5.4 10/10 151.4 0/10 - 0/10 - 0/10 - 10/10 171.4 0/10 - 0/10 -
Basic 20 5 0.20 10/10 12.4 10/10 162.3 10/10 185.6 7/10 261.9 7/10 163.7 10/10 227.1 2/10 378.5 10/10 162.2
P.W. 20 5 0.05 10/10 60.8 9/10 110.7 8/10 211.2 8/10 313.0 10/10 178.7 10/10 252.0 6/10 153.2 6/10 197.4
SA
Breach 10/10 160.1 0/10 - 3/10 383.7 0/10 - 3/10 80.4 0/10 - 6/10 307.0 3/10 92.8
Basic 20 15 0.05 10/10 264.8 9/10 236.1 8/10 385.6 8/10 505.3 7/10 341.2 5/10 391.3 8/10 273.8 10/10 273.2
P.W. 40 15 0.20 10/10 208.7 10/10 377.6 8/10 666.0 7/10 795.4 10/10 624.2 8/10 665.7 6/10 293.7 10/10 390.9
the free floating robot, we observe that our approach needs
additional time in comparison to Breach with CMA-ES (within
an order of magnitude), which is reasonable given the added
exploration on the exponentially larger state space. However,
it does increase the falsification rate with GNM and SA, for
the same reasons as before.
The difference between the two variants, Algs. 1 and 3 (the
latter with progressive widening), is not significant on most of
the examples. However, progressive widening has a positive
effect on the success rate and falsification time for S2 and S5.
In the experiments, we set the MCTS budget (number of
iterations of the main loop) to be 20–40. Note that the number
of all possible nodes is much greater: it is (1+|A|+|A|2+· · ·+
|A|K). For AT and AFC (2 input signals, L = 3× 5 and K =
5), it is 813616; and for FFR (4 input signals, L = 2×2×2×2
and K = 3), it is 4369. The overall success rates seem to
suggest that, not only in computer Go but also in hybrid system
falsification, MCTS is very effective in searching in a vast
space with limited resources.
C. Evaluation of Parameter Choices
We evaluate the effect of the parameters using the specifi-
cation S4 for the AT model, where the success of falsification
varies strongly. For the experiments in this section we focus
on Alg. 1 (Basic).
Table II contains 4 sub-tables, each showing the results for
the different optimization solvers when varying a hyperparam-
eter.
The first concern is about the scalar c for explo-
ration/exploitation. We observe that there is a general trend
that falsification rate improves with increased focus on explo-
ration. It is particularly evident when comparing the results of
c = 0.02 and c = 0.5. However, no significant performance
gap is observed between c = 0.5 and c = 1.0, indicating that
c = 0.5 is already sufficient for optimization solvers to benefit
from exploration.
Next, consider the results for different partitioning of the
input space, where L = n×m means that the throttle range is
partitioned into n actions and the brake range into m actions
(for the AT model; pedal and engine for the AFC model). We
note that the different choices have much less influence than
the scalar c. However, there are some differences, for example
GNM seems to cope badly with the coarse partitioning 2× 2
in the first column, which could be attributed to its reliance on
guidance by the MCTS layer.
With respect to the timeout for individual playouts TOPO, we
observe that it is correlated with overall falsification time. This
is expected, as we spend more time in non-falsifying regions
of the input space as well.
Varying the number of control points K (and therefore
the depth of the MCTS tree), shows that for the respective
requirement, K = 3 is insufficient but the results for more
control points are not clear. As more control points make the
problem harder due to the larger search space, the falsification
rate drops (specifically for K = 10). Note that we purposely
keep the MCTS budget and playout time consistent to expose
this effect, whereas in practice one might want to increase the
limits when the problem is more complex.
V. RELATED WORK
Formal verification approaches to correctness of hybrid
systems employ a wide range of techniques, including model
checking, theorem proving, rigorous numerics, nonstandard
analysis, and so on [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36]. These
are currently not very successful in dealing with complex real-
world systems, due to issues like scalability and black-box
components.
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TABLE II
PARAMETER VARIATION FOR ALG. 1 (BASIC) Success rate and average
time (in seconds, only successful trials) for 4 parameter variations,
respectively scalar c, input space partition L, playout timeout TOpo and the
number K of control points. The default parameter settings are: maximum
tree size (MCTS budget) is 60, and c = 0.2, L = 2, TOpo = 10, K = 5
(gray headed columns). The green backgrounded cells are the best
performers w.r.t. each solver.
c = 0.02 c = 0.2 c = 0.5 c = 1.0
Solver succ. time succ. time succ. time succ. time
CMA-ES 6/10 826.1 7/10 728.7 8/10 725.7 9/10 744.3
GNM 0/10 - 4/10 807.3 3/10 779.4 3/10 791.4
SA 1/10 719.5 8/10 733.5 9/10 736.3 8/10 799.1
L = 2× 2 L = 3× 3 L = 3× 5 L = 5× 5
Solver succ. time succ. time succ. time succ. time
CMA-ES 7/10 728.7 9/10 674.4 9/10 740.2 8/10 743.4
GNM 4/10 807.3 3/10 712.3 9/10 721.6 10/10 724.2
SA 8/10 733.5 6/10 755.7 8/10 832.0 6/10 832.8
TOpo = 5 TOpo = 10 TOpo = 15 TOpo = 20
Solver succ. time succ. time succ. time succ. time
CMA-ES 8/10 431.8 7/10 728.7 9/10 776.2 7/10 1330.1
GNM 3/10 502.6 4/10 807.3 4/10 809.4 2/10 1397.1
SA 7/10 510.5 8/10 733.5 7/10 1108.0 8/10 1342.5
K = 3 K = 5 K = 7 K = 10
Solver succ. time succ. time succ. time succ. time
CMA-ES 0/10 - 7/10 728.7 6/10 711.5 5/10 777.9
GNM 0/10 - 4/10 807.3 1/10 664.3 6/10 892.8
SA 0/10 - 8/10 733.5 8/10 709.7 3/10 750.9
Optimization-based falsification of hybrid systems has there-
fore attracted attention as a testing technique that adaptively
searches for error input using algorithms, using recent advances
in machine learning. An overview is given in [15].
We now discuss the relationship between the current work
and existing works in the context of falsification.
Monte Carlo sampling is used in [37] for falsification.
Our thesis is that Monte Carlo tree search—an extension of
Monte Carlo methods—yields a powerful guiding method in
optimization-based falsification.
The so-called multiple-shooting approach to falsification is
studied in [11]. It consists of: an upper layer that searches for
an abstract error trace given by a succession of cells; and a
lower layer, where an abstract error trace is concretized to an
actual error trace by picking points from cells. This two-layered
framework differs from ours: they focus on safety specifica-
tions (avoiding an unsafe set); this restriction allows search
heuristics that rely on spacial metrics (such as A∗ search).
In our current work, we allow arbitrary STL specifications and
use robustness values as guidance. Our framework can be seen
as an integration of multiple-shooting (the upper layer) and
single-shooting (the lower layer); they are interleaved in the
same way as search and sampling are interleaved in MCTS.
Besides MCTS, Gaussian process learning (GP learning)
has also attracted attention in machine learning as a clean
way of balancing exploitation and exploration. The GP-UCB
algorithm is a widely used strategy there. Its use in hybrid
system falsification is pursued e.g. in [12], [13].
The value of exploration/coverage has been recognized in the
falsification community [7], [6], [5], [10], not only for efficient
search for error inputs, but also for correctness guarantees in
case no error input is found. In this line, the closest to the
current work is [5], in which search is guided by a coverage
metric on input spaces. The biggest difference in the current
work is that we structure the input space by time, using time
stages (see Fig. 3). We explore this staged input space in the
disciplined manner of MCTS. In [5] there is no such staged
structure in input spaces, and they use support vector machines
(SVM) for identifying promising regions. Underminer [38] is a
falsification tool that learns the (non-)convergence of a system
to direct falsification and parameter mining. It supports STL
formulas, SVMs, neural nets, and Lyapunov-like functions as
classifiers.
Tree-based search is also used in [10] for falsification. They
use rapidly-exploring random trees (RRT), a technique widely
used for path planning in robotics. Their use of trees is geared
largely towards exploration, using the coverage metric called
star discrepancy as guidance. In their algorithm, robustness-
guided hill-climbing optimization plays a supplementary role.
This is in contrast to our current framework, where we use
MCTS and systematically integrate it with hill-climbing opti-
mization.
Many works in coverage-guided falsification [7], [10] use
metrics in the space of output or internal states, instead of the
input space. A challenge in such methods is that, in a complex
model, the correlation between input and output/state is hard to
predict. It is hard to steer the system’s output/state to a desired
region.
There have been efforts to enhance expressiveness of MTL
and STL, so that engineers can express richer intentions—such
as time robustness and frequency—in specifications [27], [39].
This research direction is orthogonal to ours; we are able to
investigate the use of such logics in our current framework.
Other recent works with which our current results could
be combined include [25], which mines parameter regions,
and [14] that aims to exploit features of machine learning
components of system models for the sake of falsification.
We believe that the combination of MCTS and application-
specific lower-layer optimization—an instance of which is the
proposed falsification framework—is a general methodology
applicable to a variety of applications. For example, for the
MaxSAT problem, the work [40] uses MCTS combined with
hill-climbing local optimization.
Use of MCTS for search-based testing of hybrid systems is
pursued in [29]. We differ from [29] in the target systems: ours
are deterministic, while [29] searches for random seeds for
stochastic systems. We also combine robustness-guided hill-
climbing optimization.
There are strong similarities between our falsification ap-
proach using MTCS and statistical model checking (SMC)
using importance splitting [41]. The robustness semantics of
STL can be seen as a “heuristic score function” [42], with
both approaches using time staging and the notion of “levels”
to iteratively guide the search to more promising subspaces.
The principal difference is that importance splitting randomly
explores a diverse set of traces that satisfy the property (in
order to reduce the variance of the estimate of its probability),
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while our falsification approach finds a single falsifying input
by optimizing (exploiting) the results of random exploration.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we have presented a two-layered optimization
framework for hybrid system falsification. It combines Monte
Carlo tree search—a widely used stochastic search method that
effectively balances exploration and exploitation—and hill-
climbing optimization—a local search method whose use in
hybrid system falsification is established in the community.
Our experiments demonstrate its promising performance.
In addition to the future work already outlined in §V, we
add the following.
We have shown how systematic exploration can improve the
chances of finding error input. Such exploration can also be
used as a measure of confidence about a system’s validity, in
the case that no error input is found (see [5], [10] and §V).
Concretely, it would be interesting to compute a quantitative
coverage metric from the result of our MCTS algorithm.
Our choice of simple grid partitioning of actions in MCTS
search trees achieves good performance. Other choices are also
possible, such as using the extension of MCTS to continuous
action sets in [28], [43].
Finally, an extension of our framework to stochastic hybrid
systems does not seem hard, following the MCTS approach
in [29] that uses models with direct access to randomness seeds
(see §V).
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